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SICK SIXTY
A Proposed Revision of Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act.
ARTaUR JOHN KEEFFE, JOHN J. KELLY, JR., AND MYRON S. LEWIS
Think of the effect on business if the headlines of the Wall Street Journal
this morning proclaimed: Supreme Court Voids All Security Devices as Bank-
ruptcy Preferences. While such a catastrophe is not yet upon us, its proba-
bility has been foreshadowed by the wording of Section 60a' of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and the logical implications of Corn Exchange National Bank and
Trust Co. v. Klauder.2
PRESENT PREFERENCE LAW
Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act defines a preference as any transfer
made for an antecedent debt within four months before the filing of a pe-
tition in bankruptcy which transfer enables a creditor to get a greater per-
centage of his debt than other creditors of this same class if the transfer is
made while the debtor is insolvent.3 There is nothing new or startling in this
definition of a preference. Much the same idea has obtained in preference
definitions in earlier Anglo-American bankruptcy legislation.
4
In the Chandler Act of 1938,1 this conventional definition was changed
152 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 96 (1943).
"318 U. S. 434, 63 Sup. Ct. 679 (1943). This is the only case thus far decided under
Section 60a by the Supreme Court
S52 STAT. 869(a) (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 96(a) (1943) ; (a) A preference is a transfer,
as defined in this title, of any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a
creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while
insolvent and within four months before the filing by or against him of the petition
in bankruptcy, or of the original petition under chapter 10, 11, 12 or 13 of this title,
the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater per-
centage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class. For the purposes of
subdivisions a and b of this section, a transfer shall be deemed to have been made at
the time when it became so far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser from the debtor
and no creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the property so transferred
superior to the rights of the transferee therein, andt if such transfer is not perfected
prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy or of the original petition under chapter
10, 11, 12 or 13 of this title, it shall be deemed to have been immediately before bank-
ruptcy.4The same general concept of a preference was used in the Act of July 1, 1898, c.
541 § 60, 30 STAT. 562 (1898). Today a preference holder is penalized by allowing
the trustee in bankruptcy to recover back from the preferred creditor the amount of
the preference; in England in earlier days the penalty was slightly more personal in
that the bankrupt himself paid for the preference by the loss of one ear and exhibition
in the local pillory for two hours. 3 CoLLmR, BANxRuFrcy 60.04 (14th ed., Moore and
Oglebay 1941).
652 STAT. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 1 (Supp. 1946).
9"9
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by adding a provision that a transfer is not made until it is perfected, and
further that no transfer is perfected if a bona fide purchaser or any creditor
can obtain an interest in the security superior to that of the transferee. If
not so perfected against bona fide purchasers and creditors, the transfer shall
be deemed perfected immediately before bankruptcy, and hence within the
four months preference period. And unless such a transfer be so perfected
more than four months before bankruptcy, it is voidable and recoverable
back by the trustee in an action under Section 60(b) 6 on a showing that at
the time of the transfer the creditor had reasonable cause to believe the
bankrupt insolvent.
Before 1943, there was much speculation as to the real meaning of these
changes.7 Was the Act designed to settle controversies merely between actual
subsequent bona fide purchasers or creditors, or did it intend to strike down
as a preference any transfer where a potential bona fide purchaser or creditor
(even though in fact none existed) could get superior rights in the security?
This speculation was set to rest by the Supreme Court in Corn Exchange
National Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder,8 where the Court clearly adopted
the view that, if a potential bona fide purchaser or creditor can obtain a su-
perior right, the transfer is a voidable preference, saying:
"This is undoubtedly the effect of a literal reading of the Act. Its
apparent command is to test the effectiveness of a transfer, as against
-the trustee, by the standards which applicable state law would enforce
against a good-faith purchaser. Only when such a purchaser is precluded
from obtaining superior rights is the trustee so precluded. So long as the
transaction is left open to possible intervening rights to such a purchaser,
it is vulnerable to the intervening bankruptcy."9 (Italics added.)
Under 60a, as thus interpreted, the practical difficulty is that the following
credit devices become imperfect transfers and voidable preferences:
1. Trust receipts,10
652 STAT. 870 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 96(b) (1943).
71n 1940 the Fifth Circuit held that section 60(a) did not declare a transfer a pref-
erence if made for present consideration despite the possibility of a potential bona fide
purchaser obtaining superior interests in the security. Adams v. City Bank & Trust
Co., 11 F. 2d 453 (C. C.A. 5th 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 699, 61 Sup. Ct. 739(1941). However, the Maryland District Court held in 1941 that the statute referred
to a potential bona fide purchaser or a potential creditor. In re Seim Construction Co.,
37 F. Supp. 855 (D. Md. 1941); see also Mulder, Ambiguities in the Chandler Act, 89
U. OF PA. L. Rsv. 10, 22 (1940); McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend
the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 369, 389 (1936).
8318 U. S. 434, 63 Sup. Ct. 679 (1943).
9Id. at 436, 63 Sup. Ct. at 679.10UNIFoRo TRusT REcEII'rs Acr § 9, 9 U.L.A. 687, provides that a bona fide purchaser
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2. Conditional sales for resale,"'
3. Factoring agreements,
1 2
4. Blanket chattel mortgage arrangements, 3
5. Assignment of accounts receivable in jurisdictions where notice to the
principal debtor is necessary -to perfect the assignment.
14
Each is voidable in bankruptcy for one reason and one alone-that a bona
fide purchaser acquires better title to the security than the lienor.15
For instance, as every business man knows, the automobile dealer gives a
trust receipt to his banker on the distinct understanding that any bona fide
purchaser of, the car on his floor will obtain a better title to the car than the
dealer derives from the trust receipt. This transaction is a preference under
Section 60a.
A security device doomed to failure in bankruptcy is useless since the pur-
pose of security is not so much to prevent dishonesty as it is to secure a pre-
ferred position in insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings. Because of its dev-
astating effect on the above security devices, if for no other reason, the
present preference section should be torn out by the roots.
In the Klauder case'16 the Court made it equally clear that if either a pur-
chaser or creditor can obtain higher rights than the security holder the trans-
fer will be preferential.'
7
takes free-of the security holder's lien. This act has been adopted in twenty-one Ameri-
can jurisdictions, including New York, California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Penn-
sylvania, and Illinois. See also, Note,' 26 CORNELL L. Q. 306 (1941).
"lUNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES AcT § 9, 2 U.L.A. 15, provides that a bona fide pur-
chaser may obtain a superior title to the security holder if goods are expressly or im-
pliedly intended for resale. Twelve jurisdictions have adopted this act.
12N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 43 provides that bona fide purchasers from a factor shall
take title superior to the lienor. Much postwar financing, especially in the electrical field,
has been done through the use of this credit device. Ireton, Trust Receipts and Factors'
Liens (1945) Proc. Section of Corp. Banking and Mercantile Law A. B.A. 106.
I3 N. Y. LIEN LAw § 230-c provides for filing for doing a continuous chattel mortgage
business in automobiles and § 230-c(6) provides that the bona fide purchaser shall take
free of the mortgagee's interest.
14 These states folloAv the English rule of Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep.
475, 10 Eng. Rul. Cas. 478 (1823, 1827). For the most recent analysis of the state of
the law in American jurisdictions see Kessler, Assignment of Accounts Receivable, 33
CALIF. L. REv. 40, 70 (1945) ; Kupfer and Livingston, Corn Exchange National Bank
& Trust Company v. Klauder Revisited, 33 VA. L. REv. 1 (1947).
'
6 The above are not the only credit devices that fall. Others also fall because cred-
itors can obtain better title. In re Gruner, 295 N. Y. 510, 68 N. E. 2d 514 (1946)
note, 32 CORNELL L. Q. 402 (1947).
'
6 Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434, 63 Sup. Ct.
679 (1943).
171d. at 439, 63 Sup. Ct. at 682. Since the Klauder case, In re Vardaman Shoe Co.,
52 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Mo. 1943) extended the potential test to transfers occurring in
jurisdictions where Section 173 of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts called the
1947]
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In view of this literal interpretation, it is possible that the next Klauder
case will hold all security devices voidable by the trustee in bankruptcy since
potential creditors always obtain superior rights to those of a security holder.
If what 60a means is that any security transfer is voidable if any potential
creditor can obtain an interest in the security superior to the transferee
(whether he has done so or not), then what security can be safely taken?
Take X who makes a loan to the bankrupt and receives back an ordinary
real estate mortgage five years before bankruptcy. The property of the bank-
rupt may always become subject to unpaid state real estate taxes. These
taxes, though subsequent to the mortgage loan are by statute made prior to
the lien of the mortgage even though the lien accrues only days before bank-
ruptcy. 'Thus the state within the meaning of 60a is potentially a superior
creditor and under the test of 60a the mortgage is a voidable preference since
not perfected against this eventuality, and therefore deemed to be made im-
mediately prior to bankruptcy.
In addition to the omnipresent state and federal tax lien priorities,' 8 there
are in many jurisdictions artisans' liens'9 and other statutory liens 20 which
are accorded special priority superior. to the rights of any security holder.
Thus, under the literal wording of 60a certain creditors can always get
higher rights than ainy security holder, and therefore all security devices
may be voidable preferences.
Though the above result is theoretically possible and logically compelling
neither the authors nor a realistic reader, we are sure, will seriously contend
that the Supreme Court should or would go so far. It would completely
upset credit financing. But the fact remains that this is the clear command
of the present statute and our point is that ambiguity of this Sort is not de-
"four horseman" rule applies. However, the later Circuit Court case In re Rosen, 157
F. 2d 997 (C. C. A. 3d 1946), cert. denied, - U. S. -, 67 Sup. Ct. 972 (1947) refused
to extend the potential bona fide purchaser test. For a detailed comparison of the two
cases see Kupfer and Livingston, Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Company v.
Kluder Revisited, 32 VA. L. REv. 910 (1946), 33 VA. L. REv. 1 (1947).18REv. STAT. § 466 (1875), 31 U.S.C.A. § 191 (1940). Note, 56 YALE L. J. 1258
(1947). But compare Clark, Federal Tax Liens and Their Enforcement, 33 VA. L. REv.
13 (1947). In accord with the writers position is In re Read-York Inc., 152 F. 2d 313
(C. C.A. 7th 1945) where a federal statutory lien was given priority over a prior
private lien. For analysis of theory and cases see Kupfer and Livingston, op. cit. supra
note 17, 32 VA. L. REv. 910, 926 (1946).
1952 STAT. 876 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 107 (b) (1943); Snedeker, Security Devices
as Preferences ouer the Bankruptcy Act, 8 Mo. L. REv. 85, 91-93, n. 23 (1943).
2052 STAT. 876 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 107 '(b) (1943). See Illinois v. Campbell, 329
U. S. 362, 67 Sup. Ct. 340 (1946) involving ILLINOIs STAT. ANN. (Jones 1944) § 45.154
(e) which gives a lien to the state on "all the personal property" for state unemployment
compensation taxes.
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sirable in a statute such as 60a governing ordinary every day business tran-
sactions.
The drastic defects of the present section 60 have been exhaustively pre-
sented in recent legal periodicals.2 1 Our purpose is not to go into elaborate
detail as to its deficiencies, but rather to analyze the bill to revise 60a which
has been recently introduced into the House22 and Senate, 2 and to suggest
improvements in the bill.
THE PROPOSED BILL TO AMEND 60A
In response to the dissatisfaction aroused by the bona fide purchaser test
and its literal construction in the Klauder case 24 the American Bar Associ-
ation, Section on Corporations, Banking and Mercantile Law appointed a
committee to draft a revision of Section 60a. The committee proposal, with
slight alteration, is currently before Congress.26
21McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HARV. L. REv. 233 (1946);
Hanna, Some Unsolved Problems under Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, 43 COL. L.
REV. 58 (1943) ; Ireton, A Proposal to Amend Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, A6
CoRP. REORG. 257, 287 (1947); Snedeker, Security Devices as Prefere)wes under the
Bankruptcy Act, 8 Mo. L. REv. 85 (1943); Oglebay, Proposed Revision of Section 60A
of the Bankruptcy Act: A Step Backward, 21 J. N. A. RxF. BANxR. 54 (1947) ; Mulder,
Ambiguities in the Chandler Act, 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 10 (1940) ; Kupfer and Living-
ston, Corn Exchange National Bank & Trnst Company v. Klauder Revisited, 32 VA. L.
REv. 910 (1946), 33 VA. L. REv. 1 (1947).
22H.R. 2412, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. (1947). See Ireton, A Proposal to Amend Section
60A of the Bankruptcy Act, A6 CoRP. REORG. 287 (1947).
23S. 826, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) ; Ireton, supra note 22.24Corn Exchange National Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434, 63 Sup.
Ct. 679 (1943).
25The special committee consisted of Messrs. Homer J. Livingston, Milton P. Kupfer,
J. Francis Ireton, and Professors James A. McLaughlin and John Hanna. See Ireton,
A Proposal to Amend Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, A6 CorP. REORG. 257 n. 2,
288 n. 2 (1947).2GIreton, supra note 25 at 287.
"a. (1) A preference is a transfer, as defined in this Act, of any of the property
of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt,
made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the
filing by or against him of the original petition initiating a proceeding under this Act,
the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater per-
centage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class: Provided, however, That
this section shall have no application to proceedings under chapter IX of this Act.
"(2) For the purpose of subdivisions a and b of this section, and subject to the
provisions of paragraph (3), a transfer shall be deemed to have been made or suffered
at the time when it became so far perfected that no creditor obtaining under applicable
law by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract a lien on such property
without a special priority (whether or not such a creditor exists), could acquire, after
such perfection, any rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights of the
transferee therein, and if such transfer is not so perfected prior to the filing of the
original petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, it shall be deemed to have been
made immediately before the filing of such original petition: Provided, however, That
where real property is transferred for or on account of an antecedent debt, the transfer
1947]
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The new bill will correct many of the objectionable provisions in the present
sixty and to the extent that it does so, the authors of the bill deserve the
gratitude of the profession.
But the difficulty is that along with these beneficial changes there are cer-
tain dangerous and undesirable ones.
The chief purpose of this paper is to direct attention to these defects and
ask their elimination.
Beneficial Changes
The outstanding change made by the Bill is the elimination of, the bona fide
purchaser test, and the substitution in its place of the judgement creditor test.
In essence the judgment creditor test is this :-if a potential judgment could
acquire interests in the security superior to those of the transferee, then the
transfer is a preference voidable by the trustee in bankruptcy. Its chief ad-
vantage is that it saves desirable security devices such as trust receipts and
others enumerated above which are preferences under the present statute
since not perfected against bona fide purchasers. The draftsmen wisely in-
serted an express statement that the creditor test will be applied "whether
or not such a creditor exists" thus avoiding possible misconstruction of their
intention to provide a potential judgment creditor test.
shall be, deemed to have been made at the time when it became so far perfected that
no bona fide purchaser from the debtor could acquire, after such perfection, any rights
in the property so transferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein.
"(3) A transfer, wholly or in part, for or on account of a new and contemporaneous
consideration shall, to the extent of such consideration and interest thereon and the
other obligations of the transferor connected therewith, be deemed to be made or suf-
fered at the time of the transfer, unless the applicable law requires the transfer to be
perfected by recording, delivery or otherwise, in order that no creditor described in
paragraph (2) could acquire, after such perfection, any rights in the property so trans-
ferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein. A transfer to secure a future
loan, if such loan is actually made, or a transfer which becomes security for a future
loan, shall have the same effect as a transfer for or on account of a new and contempo-
raneous consideration. If any requirement specified in this paragraph (3) exists, the
time of the transfer shall be determined by the following rules:
"I. Where (A) the applicable law specifies a stated period of time of not more
than thirty days after the transfer within which recording, delivery, or some other
act is required, and compliance therewith is had within such stated period of time
or where such stated period of time is more than thirty days, and compliance there-
with is had within thirty days after the transfer, the transfer shall be deemed to be
made or suffered at the time of the transfer.
"II. Where compliance with the law applicable to the transfer is not had in ac-
cordance with the provisions of subparagraph I, the transfer shall be deemed to be
made or suffered at the time of compliance therewith, and if such compliance is not
had prior to the filing of the original petition initiating a proceeding under this
Act, such transfer shall be deemed to have been made or suffered immediately before
the filing of such original petition."
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The provisions in the statute that the test will be that of a judgment
creditor's lien "without special priority" is excellent in that .it effectively
kills the possibility of any such horrendous calamity affecting the business
world as that mentioned in our opening paragraphs. Thus the fictitious judg-
ment creditor will not have the advantage of top priority statutory liens such
as tax and artisans' liens with which to invalidate otherwise sound security
devices.27
As to real property transfers the new bill retains the bona fide purchaser
test for the plain and sufficient reason that recording statutes universally
provide for perfection of title against even good faith purchasers. Since real
property transactions can be so easily perfected against bona fide puchasers,
it was thought reasonable to require such perfection.
Another major imprbvement made by the new bill is to be found in sub-
section (3). Its effect is to save from the stigma of an antecedent debt for
thirty days transfer8 for present and equivalent consideration whose perfec-
tion cannot be achieved simultaneously with the transfer.
For example, under the present statute if money is loaned today and a
real property mortgage is executed and exchanged today to secure the loan
but the recordation is delayed for so much as one day, perfection of the se-
curity transfer will take place tomorrow, and thus will be a security transfer
for an antecedent debt (i.e. the antecedent debt being the loan made today).
If the mortgagor should be adjudged bankrupt within four months of recorda-
tion, the mortgagee would hold but a voidable preference since the transfer
was made (perfected) for an antecedent debt within four months of bank-
ruptcy.
Under the new bill if the transaction is recorded within thirty days it will
be saved from the antecedent debt ban and considered to have taken place
at the time of the load and actual security transfer,28 provided state law al-
lows thirty days or longer in which to record. Although this is in effect a
"relation back" for a limited period of not to exceed thirty days, its useful-
ness is indicated by examples such as the above as well as by the practical
impossibility in a complicated security transaction of perfecting the transfer
simultaneously with the exchange of documents or actual transfer. This is
not to be confused with the infamous "relation back" doctrine which will be
discussed later in the paper.29
271d. at 289. See also note 15 supra; In re Gruner, 295 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E. 2d 514
(1946) where other members of the New York Stock Exchange are given special pri-
ority and thus under present 60a would invalidate any loan on a member's seat; Note,
32 CORNELL L. Q. 402 (1947).28Ireton, A Proposal to Amend 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, A6 CORP. REoRG. 287, 290.29Sexton v. Kessler & Co., 225 U. S. 90, 32 Sup. Ct. 657 (1912) ; see note 39 infra.
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Defects
There are two major defects in the proposed bill.
Defect One
The history of preference statutes until 1943 has been a series of frus-
trated attempts by the legislators to strike down secret equitable liens.30 In
holding that the bona fide purchaser test finally succeeded in emasculating
,secret liens, Mr. Justice Jackson writing for the Court said:
... for thirty-five years Congress has consistently reached out to
strike down secret transfers, and the courts have with equal consistence
found its efforts faulty or insufficient to that end."3'
It is the contention of the writers that the proposed judgment creditor test
is once again "faulty or insufficient to that end," 32 in that it revives with
unimpaired vigor the inequities of the secret lien. The new bill fails to strike
down secret equitable liens in all situations in which, under applicable state
law, the equitable lienor acquires rights superior to those which a subsequent
judgment creditor could obtain.
In the law of liens, equitable and secret liens are generally coextensive.
Most equitable liens are secret, and most secret liens are equitable.3 3 It is
in their secrecy that the basic unfairness of equitable liens arises. The or-
dinary tradesman in his business transactions extends credit relying pretty
much on appearances. He is not too concerned with the actual financial con-
dition of his trade debtor so long as the debtor has sufficient visible assets,
apparently unencumbered, such as a stock in trade or accounts receivable,
303 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 60.48 (14th ed., Moore and Oglebay, 1941); Hanna,
Some Unsolved Problems londer Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, 43 COL. L. Rxv.
58 (1943); McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act,
4 U. oF CmI. L. REv. 369 (1936) ; Neuhoff, Assignment of Accounts Receivable as Af-
fected by the Chandler Act, 34 ILL. L. REv. 538 (1940) ; Mulder, Ambiguities in the
Chandler Act, 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 10 (1940) ; Hamilton, The Effect of Section Sixty
of the Bankruptcy Act upon Assignments of Accounts Receivable, 26 VA. L. Rav. 168(1938).
31Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434, 438, 63
Sup. Ct. 679, 682 (1943).
-
2Ibid.
33"The equitable lien is a dangerous arid elusive enemy of the law of preferences.
As applied to some bankruptcy cases it seems as well named as the Holy Roman Em-
pire for it is neither equitable nor a lien." McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy
Act, 40 HARv. L. REV. 341, 389 (1927).
Though equitable liens are usually secret this is not necessarily the case. Occasion-
ally, a recordation of a legal lien will fail, for one reason or another, to establish the
desired, legal lien. In such cases of failure of a legal lien, it is usually held that an
equitable lien arises in its stead. In these cases, the lien is not necessarily secret, but
still equitable.
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out of which to satisfy his trade debt. Knowing that there are no recorded
liens against the assets, he feels free to sell 'on 'the security of the debtor's
assets. Does it not seem unjust to permit the holder of a secret lien, equitable
in nature, to assert his lien in bankruptcy with rights superior to those of
such a creditor? The injustice of such lien priority is aggravated when one
realizes that the secrecy of such a lien is not accidental, but usually delib-
erate and closely guarded both by the favored creditor and the panicky debtor
on the brink of insolvency.
During the past thirty years legislatures,34 judges,2 5 and writers36 who
have studied the equitable lien have almost unanimously concluded that it
is an unfair preference of the most flagrant type.
To illustrate more graphically, consider Sexton v. Kessler3 7 which so
aroused the ire of the late Chief Justice Stone.38
There stocks and bonds were placed in a vault in the bankrupt's place
of business with a tag on them that they were to be security for a favorite
creditor. The transfer was obviously imperfect because there was no actual
delivery of the securities to the creditor until a few days before bankruptcy.
Furthermore, there was a reservation of dominion in the bankrupt who re-
served the right to go into the vault arfd substitute securities in the package
as he desired.3 9 The Supreme Court of the United States held that though
the transfer was imperfect because of non-delivery of the securities, the cred-
itor had a valid equitable lien good against creditors and the trustee in bank-
ruptcy.
By statute New York has repealed the rule of this case as to stock and
bonds only.40  1
3430 STAT. 562 (1898) and amendments. See also Bankruptcy Act as Amended by
the Chandler Act, COLLrER-BEFNDER (Pamphlet Ed. 1938).35Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434, 63 Sup. Ct.
679 (1943) ; Adams v. City Bank & Trust Co., 115 F. 2d 453 (C. C. A. 5th 1940), cert.
denied, 312 U. S. 699, 61 Sup. Ct. 739 (1941).36Ibid; Mulder, Ambiguities i the Chandler Act, 89 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 10 (1940);
McLaughlin, Aspects of Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. OF CH. L.
REv. 369 (1936); Note, 34 YALE L. J. 891 (1925).
37225 U. S. 90, 32 Sup. Ct 657 (1912).38Stone, The Equitable Mortgage in New York, 20 COL. L. REv. 519 (1920).
39In the case itself, the holding was that the transfer made a few days before bank-
ruptcy "related back" to the date of the acquisition of the equitable lien that arose from
the imperfect escrow. Thus, the transfer so "related back" was outside the four months
period and the lien good in bankruptcy.
Proponents of the new bill contend that the obnoxious "relation back" doctrine has
been struck down. It is admitted that "relation back" itself is not reinstated, but the
same evil would obtain from the validation of equitable liens. The means would be
different but the undesirable result the same.
40N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 230.
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But in other states and in New York with respect to property other than
stocks and bonds, the rule of Sexton v. Kessler will rise from the grave to
plague the business world if we amend the .present 60a by substituting the
judgment creditor test of the proposed bill.
Secret equitable liens of the sort upheld in Sexton v. Kessler cannot be
justified. Why 9hould Congress in 1948 restore by statute the rule of Sexton
v. Kessler that the late Chief Justice Stone so bitterly excorciated in 192041
and which was, as the result of his efforts and the efforts of other scholars,
was changed by the enactment of Section,60 in its present form in 1938?
Present Section 60 has faults but it does have the merit of destroying the
rule of Sexton v. Kessler and no change in Section 60 can be considered that
restores so rotten a rule.
Lest anyone suppose that the secret equitable lien is limited to a Sexton
v. Kessler situation, let it be said that they are so numerous and of such
infinite variety that great injustice will be done by any blanket recognition
of their validity. 42
The prime evil of secret equitable liens is that they lead to a mad scramble
for the insolvent debtor's assets, wholly uncontrolled by any just and reason-
able pro rata distribution of the bankrupt's estate. Voidable preferences are
estalfilished by statute to assist in formulating a fair and impartial balance
between secured and unsecured creditors of a bankrupt.43 If equitable liens
are not included in the' Bankruptcy Act as preferences, then much of the
force and justice of the preference section is lost.
How to Cure Defect One
Our recommendation is that there be inserted in subsection (2) of the
House and Senate Bills a- proviso reading:
"For the purposes of this section such a creditor shall be deemed to
have an interest. superior to that of any equitable lienor."
This proposal retains the principal advantage of the present law in requir-
41Stone, The Equitable Mortgage in New York, 20 CoL. L. REv. 519, 531 (1920).42In at least eighteen states today some form of equitable liens give the lienor rights
superior to that which a judgment creditor may acquire. For analysis of jurisdictions
where and situations in which equitable lienors prevail over judgment creditors see
PomEROy, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENcE § 721-23 (5th ed. 1941). •
Recognition of the fact that a judgment creditor test would reinstate equitable liens
may be found in It re Seim Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 855, 858 (D. Md. 1941).43McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HARv. L. REv. 233, 234 (1946);
McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HAgv. L. REv. 341, 390 (1927)
see also note 21 supra.
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ing an high degree of perfection of security devices, and cures its worst fault,
the invalidation of many useful security devices.
The suggestion will undoubtedly be attacked on the ground that it will
raise the trustee in bankruptcy to a preferred status in which he does not
theoretically belong. The argument roughly is that since after the filing of
the petition he has only the status of a sinmple judgment creditor, he should
not have a preferred status as regards the four months period preceding
bankruptcy.44 This has also been one of the nmain points of attack on the bona
fide purchaser test.45 On the grounds of pure logic and consistency, the
premises of this argument are indisputable. However, it is once again pointed
out that the prime purpose of bankruptcy is to secure a fair and impartial
distribution of assets among the insolvent's creditors. 46 It is submitted that
even though the proposal departs from the formal logical parallelism of the
"status" argument, it does effectuate the foremost consideration in bankruptcy
-proportional participation among creditors of the same class. Even the
draftsmen of the new bill recognize that departure from the status concept
was necessary and desirable when they retained the bona fide purchaser test
as to real property.47
Defect Two and the Suggested Cure
Federal or State Law in the Determination of Preferences
Th second criticism of the ihew statute relates to that part which ties
Bankruptcy preferences to state law. The Constitution creates the bank-
ruptcy power by providing that "The Congress shall have the power . . . to
establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the
United States. '48
Is the constitutional mandate met when bankruptcy preferences are tested
not by one law, but by the varying and inconsistent laws of the forty-eight
states ?
As one of the members of the drafting committee has put it, "With the
44Ireton, A Proposal to Amend Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, A6 CoRP. REORG.
257, 260-1 (1947) ; Hanna, Some Unsolved Problems under Section 60A of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 43 COL. L. REv. 58, 59 (1943).
45Ibid.
46See notes 21 and 43 supra.471reton, A Proposal to Amend Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, A6 CoRp. REoRG.
257, 270 (1947).
In retaining the bona fide purchaser test as to real property transfers the draftsmen
of the bill would kill equitable liens as to real property, but not as to any other prop-
erty, tangible or intangible.
48U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8.
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effect of the Section running across the lines of forty-eight states, with vary-
ing sovereign laws affecting a great variety of commercial transactions, the
problem is not simple, nor can it be easily stated. '49 So long as the preference
law is dependent on state law, the problem is indeed complex of solution.
For example, suppose A is a bankrupt in New York. B is one of A's cred-
itors. A owned two organ factories, one in New York and one in Oklahoma.
Six months before bankruptcy B loaned money to A for which A gave mort-
gages purporting to include in the mortgage after acquired chattels. In New
York any lien under the after acquired property clause is a preference under
the present or either of the proposed statutes so long as the test is by local
law,"° because a creditor can acquire rights superior to that of the lienor.
In Oklahoma, where the general law prevails, the transfer is not a preference
since creditors cannot obtain higher rights than those of the lienor under
an identical mortgage.-5 Thus we have the ridiculous situation in which the
same transaction is called a preference in one state but not in the other merely
because of intervening state lines. This situation is impractical and illogical.
The above example is not unique ;52 it is merely'set forth as typifying the
unsatisfactory state of the present law.
Steps have been taken in other fields of the law to correct this defect.
Uniform laws have been drafted and adopted53 in increasing numbers of
states, and a Federal Commercial Code5 4 is presently being drafted. Is it
not time then that bankruptcy preferences be tested uniformly in line with
the constitutional command?
We propose that subsection (2) be amended by addinig at the end thereof
the following provision:
"Provided, further, that for the purposes of this section, applicable
law shall be construed to mean the statutes' of a state and the common
law of a state providing such common law accords with general law."
This proposal would embody the rule of Swift v. TysonO in the preference
section of the Bankruptcy Act. The rule of the Tyson case was that in com-
491reton, A Proposal to Amend Sectiom 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, A6 CoRP. REORG.
287, 291 (1947).50Zartman v. First National Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N. E. 127 (1907).5 1 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1937) tit. 16, § 17 and tit. 42, § 8.
.
5 2 See note 42 supra.53Though it is recognized that the uniform laws become law only in states where
adopted, they are a useful attempt to cut down the many differences in the law caused
by the accident of state lines.54The draft of the code has not yet been completed, but its purpose is to apply one
law to commercial transactions among the states.
5516 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
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mercial transactions the law of the state would be followed only if in accord
with general law, i.e. the better view in common law jurisdictions. It is to
be noted that neither the Tyson case, nor our proposed amendment, attempts
to override state law as set forth -by statute.5 6
The doctrine of Swift v. Tyson was overruled by Erie v. Tompkins5 7 as
applied to cases where jurisdiction in the federal courts was based on di-
versity of citizenship. Much has been written as to the application of the
Erie case in fields other than diversity.58 In Prudence Realization Corporation
v. Geist,59 subsequent to the Erie holding, the Supreme Court held that in
the distribution of assets in bankruptcy the general law would be applied
though directly contrary to the case law of New York, the state in which
the transactions took place.
Still later than the Prudence case was Corn Exchange National Bank and
Trust Co. v. Klauder ° holding that a preference would be tested by appli-
cable state law. However, the Klatder case involved exclusively the construc-
tion of Section 60a, and in no way is authoritative in limiting or delimiting
the constitutional choice of general law in the bankruptcy cases or statutes.
If the preference section were changed as suggested, there would be no con-
stitutional difficulties and the Klauder case would no longer be controlling.
Conclusion
Combining the suggested changes with subsection (2) of the new bill as
introduced in Congress, the subsection would now read:
"(2) For the purpose of subdivisions a'and b of this section, and sub-
ject to the provisions of paragraph (3), a transfer shall be deemed to
have been made-or suffered at the time when it became so far perfected
that no creditor obtaining under applicable law by legal or -equitable pro-
ceedings on a simple contract a lien on such property without a special
priority (whether or not such a creditor exists), could acquire, after such
perfection, any rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights
of the transferee therein, and if such transfer is not so perfected prior
to the filing of the original petition initiating a proceeding under this Act,
56For discussion of the Swift v. Tyson rule, see Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial
Power Between State and Federal Courts, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 499 (1928); Sharp and
Brennan, The Application of the Doctrine of Swift v. Tyson since 1900, 4 IND. L. J. 367(1929) ; Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresentce of Erie
v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L J. 267 (1946).
57304 U. S. 64, 65 Sup. Ct. 1466 (1938).
58Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Co., 313 U. S. 487, 61 Sup. Ct. 1020 (1941) (extending
Erie doctrine to conflicts of law); Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U. S. 89,
62 Sup. Ct. 978 (1942) (refusing to apply Erie rule to bankruptcy).
59316 U. S. 89, 62 Sup. Ct. 978 (1943).
60318 U. S. 434, 63 Sup. Ct. 679 (1943).
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it shall be deemed to have been made immediately before the filing of such
original petition: Provided, however, for the purposes of this section such
a creditor shall be deemed to have an interest superior to that of any
equitable liewor, and: Provided, further, however, that where real prop-
erty is transferred for or on, account of an antecedent debt, the transfer
shall be deemed to have been made at the time when it became so far
perfected that no bona fide purchaser from the debtor could acquire, after
such perfection, any rights in the property, so transferred superior to the
rights of the transferee therein. Provided, further, that for the purposes
of this section, applicable law shall be construed to mean the statutes of
a state and the com'mon law of a state providing the common. law is in
accord with general law."
Under the proposed statute, if any state wishes to recognize any equitable
liens, it is free to raise them to the status of legal liens by statutory provision.
It is felt that such remedy should be left to the states in the event that it
decided as a matter of public policy or commercial necessity that certain liens,
hitherto equitable, were desirable. By cbdifying the security device, a state
can raise a lien to the status of a legal lien, thus bringing it outside the first
proposal. The saving of the statutory exception under the second change en-
ables a state to decide its public policy by statute, and make it binding, though
contrary to the doctrines of general law.
It is not contended by the authors that there are no equitable "liens that
could be useful and satisfactory credit devices in a sound economy.
For example, the authors feel that instead of using the bulky, cumbersome
corporate mortgage indentures the English and Canadian device of the "float-
ing charge"' 1 could be well utilized by our large corporations and public util-
ities.6 2 Roughly, a "floating charge" is a security on all property of a cor-
poration both present and after acquired. At common law, it is an equitable
lien inferior to that of a prior levying judgment creditor. In American law,
it is at present not generally recognized. Americans should utilize it and it
could be created by statute and perfected against bankruptcy. To accomplish
this purpose a statute could accord it a superior position to that of a judg-
ment creditor. This is cited merely as a possible example of a desirable
equitable lien. Undoubtedly, some others may seem equally desirable.6
61N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 45 provides in a limited way for a lien similar to a
floating charge on merchandise consigned to factors.62 1n England and Canada, the device is much used in the public utility field and is
essentially an equitable lien. The validity of a floating charge as a lien on all assets
including after acquired property enables English and Canadian corporate indentures
to be much simpler and more easily understood than our bulky American indentures.63For example, recorded after acquired property mortgages on chattels are desirable
and could be made legal liens by statute; also the lien of members on stock exchange
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With the statutory subordination of the equitable lien and the nationaliza-
tion of the law by which a security is tested, the authors feel that the new
bill would be desirable.
The first change was called for long ago by the late Chief Justice Stone
and the second is called for by the constitutional mandate and the needs of
present day business which day by day is beset with varying interpretations
of the same transaction as it passes through each of our forty-eight states.
As thus changed the new bill ought to be just the right medicine for poor
sick sixty.*
seats. See In re Gruner, 295 N. Y. 510, 68 N. E. 2d 514 (1946) ; Note, 32 CORNELL L. Q.
402 (1947).
*The writers wish to acknowledge that this article represents the synthesis of a term's
study in the course entitled "Security Transactions" at Cornell Law School in the fall
of 1946. All members of that class, now graduated or about to graduate, contributed
greatly to the fire of classroom discussion by which we tested 60 and the proposed
amendment and found them both sick. Many other suggestions for amendment to Section
60 were tested ranging all the way from retention of the present Section 60 with specific
exceptions for named security devices to a suggestion for a statute detailing specifically
each security device with federal recordation provided for perfection. These, likewise
were found to be sick and ultimately discarded. Grateful acknowledgement is likewise
made to Lawrence Bennett, Esq., of 15 Broad Street, New York, N. Y. for first sug-
gesting to Professor Keeffe the possibilities of the floating charge, and for his many
other contributions to the classroom analysis of why Section 60 is sick.
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